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Abstract—There is a growing movement to retrofit ageing,
large scale infrastructures, such as water networks, with wireless
sensors and actuators. Next generation Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPSs) are a tight integration of sensing, control, communication,
computation and physical processes. The failure of any one of
these components can cause a failure of the entire CPS. This
represents a system design challenge to address these interde-
pendencies. Wireless communication is unreliable and prone to
cyber-attacks. An attack upon the wireless communication of CPS
would prevent the communication of up-to-date information from
the physical process to the controller. A controller without up-to-
date information is unable to meet system’s stability and perfor-
mance guarantees. We focus on design approach to make CPSs
secure and we evaluate their resilience to jamming attacks aimed
at disrupting the system’s wireless communication. We consider
classic time-triggered control scheme and various resource-
aware event-triggered control schemes. We evaluate these on
a water network test-bed against three jamming strategies:
constant, random, and protocol aware. Our test-bed results show
that all schemes are very susceptible to constant and random
jamming. We find that time-triggered control schemes are just
as susceptible to protocol aware jamming, where some event-
triggered control schemes are completely resilient to protocol
aware jamming. Finally, we further enhance the resilience of
an event-triggered control scheme through the addition of a
dynamical estimator that estimates lost or corrupted data.
Index Terms—Cyber-Physical Systems, Event-Triggered Con-
trol, Wireless Sensor/Actuator Networks, Security, Jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a recent trend to instrument and control large
infrastructure installations like water distribution networks
(WDNs), precision agriculture or unmanned off-shore oil rig
systems with wireless sensor and actuator networks [1]. In
this paper we present a design approach to make these Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPSs) secure to jamming attacks. We assess
the robustness of different controllers, as well as other qualities
such as energy efficiency on a physical test-bed. The result
of our design approach is the most jamming resilient, energy
efficient control scheme for a CPS from all the schemes
considered. We also identify the resiliency limitations of our
scheme to different jamming strategies.
The use of wireless communication enables the creation
of CPSs by adding low cost and non-intrusive monitoring
and control systems to legacy and new critical infrastructure
like WDNs. Currently, WDN pumps and valves are actuated
manually to meet the daily fluctuation of users demands.
Next generation WDNs are being deployed with automatic
controllers. The goal is to eventually integrate sensing with
actuation to make the WDNs more responsive to user demand,
and more efficient in their use of water and pump energy.
CPSs enable the actuation of physical processes by pro-
cessing sensed data with control schemes derived from control
theory. The use of a control theoretic approach provides safety
and performance guarantees [2]. However, the combination of
wireless communication and control comes with risks. If the
wireless communication is disrupted, the control schemes will
not have access to temporally relevant data, and performance
and safety guarantees can not be met. In this paper we focus
on the secure design approach of CPSs considering two types
of control schemes, time-triggered and event-triggered.
Time-Triggered Control (TTC) schemes [3] are commonly
used because they are easy to analyse and design, and they
provide safety and performance guarantees as long as they
receive sensor data at a constant, periodic rate. They are
difficult to use on CPSs based on low-cost wireless sensors and
actuators. These devices have a constrained energy capacity
which is quickly drained by constant periodic use [4].
Event-Triggered Control (ETC) schemes [5] are a solution
to the high communication costs of periodic time-triggered
transmissions. ETC schemes only transmit new measurements
and control signals when necessary while guaranteeing stabil-
ity or performance requirements. This enables a creation of
more efficient CPSs that are easier to deploy and where the
need for frequent battery changes is mitigated.
TTC and ETC schemes are unable to maintain guarantees
if they cannot receive new measurements in a timely fashion.
CPSs using wireless communication are susceptible to failure
if their communication is disrupted by a security attack [6].
Many examples can be given such as the Stuxnet attack on
Iranian uranium processing facilities [7], the multistage attack
on SCADA system in the Ukrainian power grid [8], and the
denial-of-service attack on a power grid in Germany [9]. There
is currently no design approach to address the performance and
safety guarantees of CPSs when attacked by cyber attacks.
We follow a design approach that recognises that CPS
communication and control system are tightly coupled. This
is a system level design problem, as an attack on the commu-
nication can prevent up-to-date information from reaching the
controller. This will prevent the stable operation of the system.
This specific problem is referred to as the communication and
control systems co-design problem [10], [11].
Our approach is to evaluate the resilience of two types
of controllers, TTC and ETC, to various plausible jamming
attacks [12]. We then implement these controllers on a CPS
test-bed called the WaterBox [13]. For the evaluation we use
a real jammer, with various levels of jamming sophistication,
to do real disruption of our CPS test-bed. We use the results
of the disruption as an indication of the success of our design.
The contributions of this work are threefold:
• We present and demonstrate the use of a design approach
to choose a controller for CPS. Our design approach
identifies the most jamming resilient, resource efficient
control scheme of all the schemes considered. We in-
crease the resilience of our controller with a dynamical
estimator, and identify the resiliency limitations of our
scheme.
• We present several jamming strategies of different levels
of sophistication. These are developed in order to measure
the resilience of our ETC-based controller.
• To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the
first real test-bed evaluation of the resilience of periodic
and ETC schemes to different kinds of jamming attacks
aimed at communication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 surveys
related work. Sec. 3 discusses the control and communication
system model. Sec. 4 presents the design of the three jamming
strategies. We present the evaluation results in Sec. 5 and end
the paper in Sec. 6 with brief concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Traditional periodic controllers increase the cost of sen-
sors/actuators and their maintenance requirements which
makes them unfit for the use in CPSs [4]. As an alternative,
ETC schemes have been studied widely by the control commu-
nity (e.g. [5], [14], [15]). Their use has been further enhanced
by integration with communication protocols [16]–[18].
The majority of the literature on ETC schemes integrated
with communication protocols have not considered the affects
of cyber-physical security attacks. This is an oversight if they
are going to be used to monitor or control critical infrastructure
systems like WDNs. Notable exceptions are [19]–[22]. The
method in [19] provides resilience only to a periodic jamming
attack. This is an unrealistic assumption, as jammers can be
more sophisticated rather that only emit periodically. This has
been complemented in [20]–[22] where the jamming strategy
is neither known nor pre-fixed. However, the system is only
jammed for a certain percentage of time on average to allow
for sufficiently regular data flow.
Contrarily, we identify where this resiliency limitation of
various control schemes lies for three jamming strategies.
Our protocol aware jammer is more sophisticated than those
used in above mentioned studies on ETC security. Similar
jamming strategy is given in [23]. However, unlike the design
in [23], we ensure the adaptivity property. This means that our
jammer can adapt to the change in the communication pattern
(i.e. the change in the underlying physical phenomenon). We
provide an experimental implementation which limits us from
making unrealistic assumptions such as in [22] that a node can
Fig. 1. The CPS architecture with a jammer affecting both, uplink and
downlink communication channels.
accurately differentiate a packet lost to a jammer to one lost
due to network link quality issues.
Next, we present the system model for which we evaluate
the resilience against different jamming strategies.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section we begin our design approach by describing
the dynamical control system and the communication models.
We use these to represent a smart water network which is
emulated on the WaterBox test-bed [13] in Sec. V. In Fig. 1
we present a diagram of the CPS considered in this paper. The
CPS consists of a large complex physical process (the plant)
and the control and management system which are connected
via a wireless communication network. In the case of the
WaterBox, the communication channel is a WiFi network.
We assume that sensors and actuators are collocated on
sensor/actuator nodes denoted by j = 1, . . . , N . N is the total
number of nodes that share the same frequency channel. Nodes
communicate with the controller in a single-hop fashion. The
communication from sensor/actuator nodes to the controller
and vice versa can be attacked by jamming signals.
A. Control Model
We consider a linear time-invariant dynamical system:
ξ˙(t) = Aξ(t) +Bυ(t), ξ(0) = ξ0 (1)
where ξ(t) ∈ Rn denotes the state input and υ(t) ∈ Rm
denotes the control input at time t. The matrix A ∈ Rn×n
is the state matrix and B ∈ Rn×m is the input matrix.
In a conventional time-triggered control (TTC), the sam-
pling instants tk, k ∈ N occur periodically, i.e. tk = kh for
h > 0, k ∈ N. Control actions are also sent periodically and
they work in a sample-and-hold fashion:
υ(t) = Kξ(tk), ∀t ∈ [tk, tk+1]. (2)
The feedback gain matrix is denoted as K ∈ Rn×n. At the
start of each period tk = kh, sensor/actuator nodes send their
state to a centralised TTC controller. The controller generates
a control input based on the received sensor/actuator states,
then it sends the control input back to the nodes for actuation.
In event-triggered control (ETC), the controller only updates
and sends a control input if pre-defined triggering condition is
satisfied at tk = kh for h > 0, k ∈ N. We refer to this as to
an event and it can be expressed in terms of the measurement
error, (tk) = |ξ(tk) − ξ(t)| ≤ η for t ∈ [tk, tk+1] that
exceeds the predefined threshold value η. The ETC approach
differs from the TTC where events are transmitted regularly
regardless of the state of the plant. ETC schemes only transmit
an event if one actually occurs which makes them more energy
efficient when compared to TTC. In the case of ETC, we
consider both centralised and decentralised controllers.
The control input υ(tk) at time tk of the centralised ETC
controller is given by
υ(tk) =
{
Kξ(tk), if θk = 1
Kξ(tk−1), if θk = 0
. (3)
The indicator function θk = 1 indicates that the triggering
condition is satisfied, θk = 0 indicates that the triggering
condition is not satisfied at time tk. The controller needs to
receive states from each sensor/actuator nodes periodically
in order to evaluate the triggering condition. Based on the
outcome, it sends or not an updated control action to the
sensor/actuator nodes.
In the case of the decentralised ETC controller, the trigger-
ing condition is distributed to each sensor/actuator node j. The
nodes only send their data to the controller when the threshold
is violated. The controller can recalculate the control action
using synchronous approach when upon receiving the state of
at least one node, it requests state from other nodes. Based on
these, it generates and sends a new control action:
υ(tk) =
{
Kξ(tk), if ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , N} : θkj = 1
Kξ(tk−1), if ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N} : θkj = 0 . (4)
θkj = 1 indicates that the triggering condition is satis-
fied at node j. The decentralised ETC controller can also
use asynchronous approach where only the corresponding
sensor/actuator node’s state (i.e. node that reported the
threshold violation) is used to update the control action,
i.e. if j ∈ {1, . . . , N} and θkj = 1, then ξ(tk) =
[ξ1(tk−1), ξ2(tk−1), . . . , ξj(tk), . . . , ξN (tk−1)]T .
Next we describe a communication network that is used to
pass the information between sensor/actuator nodes and the
controller. We provide three communication modes to support
different types of controllers presented here.
B. Communication Model
To support the information exchange between the system
and the controller, a TDMA-based protocol [17] is used. It al-
lows several sensor/actuator nodes to share the same frequency
channel. Time is divided into intervals Ti, i = 1, . . . ,∞,
of length T seconds. Each Ti is divided into a number of
sub-slots allocated to nodes. The node’s j slots repeat every
T seconds. The structure and purpose of the sub-slots used
for communication in different control schemes are briefly
explained next with the graphical representation in Fig. 2.
Note how the communication modes descriptions mirror the
descriptions of the control schemes that use them.
Fig. 2. The structure of a TDMA-based time interval for: a) TTC and PETC
scheme b) PSDETC scheme c) PADETC scheme.
• Periodic centralised time-triggered (TTC) & event-
triggered control (PETC) - An interval Ti is divided
into two subsets of time slots, Sxj and S
u
j , which are
separated by a time delay dc. Each sensor node transmits
its measured state to the controller during the X-slot
Sxj . The controller returns the control action to the
sensor/actuator nodes during the U-slot Suj . The delay
dc allows controller to compute the control action.
• Periodic synchronous decentralised ETC (PSDETC) -
This mode adds an additional subset of violation slots,
V-slots Svj . V-slots are used by sensor/actuator nodes to
report the threshold violation to the controller. Conse-
quently, the controller sends request to other nodes during
the X-slot. These nodes transmit their measurements
during the X-slot also which is followed by a new control
action during the U-slot.
• Periodic asynchronous decentralised ETC (PADETC) -
Compared to PSDETC, V-slots are merged with X-slots.
If there is the threshold violation, the node transmits the
new measurement; otherwise, it skips the communication
until next time interval. The controller computes the
control input based on the received information only and
returns it to all sensors in the U-slots.
The length of different subsets depends on the application
(i.e. underlying physical phenomenon) as well as on the
complexity of the control infrastructure.
C. Estimator Model
If the communication channel becomes unreliable, the
controller may not receive up-to-date states or notification
of a triggering condition being met. This would cause the
associated system’s performance degradation or in a more
severe case a complete failure. In order to avoid system failure
in the case of communication failure, there is a need for the
estimation of corrupted or lost data. The topic of estimation
over lossy networks is widely discussed in control systems
literature [2]. In this paper, estimates are computed recursively
using a time-varying Kalman filter [24].
We assume that the system in Eq. 1 is completely observ-
able, and each sensor/actuator node can access only one of
the system’s states. First, the initial state estimate is set to
zero (i.e. ξˆi(0) = 0). The state estimation error at the time
t, represents the difference between the actual state ξ(t) and
the estimated state ξˆ(t), i.e. e(t) = ξ(t)− ξˆ(t). The corrected
version of the state estimate ξˆ(t) is given by
ξˆc(t) = ξˆ(t) + Fke(t) (5)
where Fk is the Kalman filter gain. The Kalman filter gain
is chosen to minimize the estimation error covariance matrix
P (t) = E[e(t)e(t)T ] [24]. Finally, the predicted state estimate
at the time t+ 1 is defined as
ξˆ(t+ 1) = Aξˆc(t) +Bυ(t). (6)
If there is no actual state coming (e.g. due to the jamming
activity), the estimator predicts ξˆ(t+1) based on its previous
estimate. Implementation details are given in Sec. V-A.
All presented control schemes share the same vulnerability,
which is their use of wireless communication for sensed data
and control actions. For the next part of our design approach
we examine the vulnerability in more detail. We present three
strategies that can be used to jam the wireless communication
used by a CPS, prevent up-to-date data from reaching the
controller, and render the underlying physical system unstable.
It is important for us to understand the way that the attacker
functions so that it can be replicated and used to evaluate the
resilience of our control schemes.
IV. JAMMER MODEL AND ATTACKING STRATEGIES
The next part of our design approach is to understand the
potential threats to the CPS’s wireless communication. We
present three plausible jamming strategies in order to evaluate
the resilience of our control schemes to communication loss.
The strategies include, constant, random, and protocol aware
jamming. We evaluate the strategies based on the ease of de-
tection and their effectiveness. The plausibility of the jamming
strategies is demonstrated through implementation.
A. Jamming Strategies
In this paper we assume that the jammer aims to disrupt
the wireless communication on the measurements channel (i.e.
from sensor/actuator nodes to the controller) as shown in
Fig. 1. The considered jamming strategies which vary in terms
of undetectability and effectiveness of jamming as per Fig. 3
are described below.
Constant jammer - Transmits all the time. It is guaranteed
to be completely effective if the jammer is well placed and has
sufficient transmission power. Every message in the jammer’s
range will be disrupted. The negative part of constant jamming
is that it is easy to locate.
Random jammer - Transmits for fixed periods of time. We
maintained a fixed transmission period of 500ms, and varied
the sleep periods between 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, and
800ms with a uniform random distribution.
Protocol aware jammer - The aim of this method is to jam
all of the messages by learning both the transmission period
and phase of the target node. It has the shortest transmission
period, of 250ms, making it the least detectable.
Fig. 3. Effectiveness and undetectability of the proposed jamming models.
B. Jamming Strategy Metrics
We describe our jamming strategies based on two metrics,
the effectiveness of the strategy at disrupting the CPS and the
difficulty of detecting the location of the jammer.
The effectiveness of the attack assumes that we want to
completely disrupt our target CPS. To do this we measure the
packet delivery ratio (i.e. a count of the number of messages
received by the controller over the messages sent by the
target sensor/actuator node), and the deviation of the controlled
system from safe steady state operation. In the case of our
WaterBox test-bed, this is the deviation of water level in tanks.
Difficulty of detection follows from our stated goal of
complete system disruption. Once the system is disrupted, it’s
owners will notice, and come looking for the jammer. The
jammer will be easy to locate by radio triangulation. The less
time the jammer spends in transmission, the longer it will take
to be located and recover the correct operation of the CPS.
We do not use power saving as a metric, due to the fact that
a successful jammer could possibly be found and terminated
before its batteries fail, but can not ignore it as a positive side
effect for jammers that spend less time in transmission.
In the next section we present the final part of our design
approach, the evaluation test-bed. The test-bed allowed us to
evaluate the resilience of the control schemes to jamming
strategies with real radio and physical effects.
V. EVALUATION
A. WaterBox Evaluation Platform
In the previous two sections we presented the control
schemes under consideration, and the jamming strategies that
can disrupt the flow of data to our controllers, and render
the system unstable. In this section, we present the WaterBox
test-bed (see Fig. 4) that we use to evaluate the resilience of
various control schemes to various jamming strategies.
The WaterBox is designed to emulate a WDN. It allows
us to experiment with different control schemes that guaran-
tee the system’s operation within safe bounds (i.e. between
the maximum and the minimum allowed water level in the
tanks). Each sensor/actuator node is connected to a local WiFi
network to send the measured water level to the controller.
The controller’s goal is to provide control actions that ensure
system stability and performance guarantees.
The WaterBox consists of lower tank, upper tank and three
small District Meter Area (DMA) tanks. The lower tank pump
Fig. 4. The WaterBox test-bed.
supplies water to the upper tank which is then pumped to
the three small DMA tanks by the assistant pump and/or the
powerful pump. The water flow is controlled by motorized gate
valves which are based on an Edison development board. Each
DMA tank is equipped with one set of in/out-valves. Each
valve is fit with a sensor/actuator node. The WiFi transmission
levels of nodes are set to their default value of 31dBm.
The system can work in two different modes for which the
state matrix A is given as a zero matrix, i.e. Aw = Ap = O3×3,
and the input matrix B is given as
Bw = 10
−5 ×





 0.7666 −0.0493 −0.0457−0.0274 0.5848 −0.0279
−0.0393 −0.0432 0.1492
 .
The control law in Eq. 2 works in a sample-and-hold fashion
with the feedback gain matrix K given as
Kw =




 9998.5 167.1 41.0−166.6 9997.9 −116.0
−43.0 115.3 9999.2
 .
The ’weak mode’ is represented by (Aw, Bw,Kw) and it
simulates low water demand that a water network would
experience during the night when only the assistant pump
is on. The ’powerful mode’ is represented by (Ap, Bp,Kp)
and it simulates high water demand during the day when the
powerful pump is enabled.
The normal operation of the WaterBox, regardless of the
control scheme, starts in powerful mode with both pumps on.
The switching from powerful to weak mode happens when
|S(−Kpξ(t) + αinp )|1 < 180◦. S(·) is a function that maps
actuator saturation and quantization to represent the degree to
which valves are open. The valves themselves are discrete, and
open and close in steps of 10◦. The term | · |1 is L1-norm, or
sum of the entries of the resulting vector, and αinp denotes the
degree that the in-valves are open at equilibrium.
To facilitate the need for switching back to powerful mode




Timing T 1s Interval duration





j 50ms X-slot, U-slot, V-slot size
dc 10ms Computing control delay
dg 5ms Threshold violation check delay
Control hdj 3cm Maximum water level for node j
Schemes hlj 1cm Minimum water level for node j
Setup σ1 0.04 PETC violation parameter
σ2 0.05 PSDETC violation parameter
µ, ρ 85, 0.95 PADETC violation parameters
out-valves fully open. The water level will drop and when
the minimum water level hlj is reached (i.e ξj(t) ≤ hlj ), the
system switches back to the powerful mode.
The control schemes tuning parameters, as well as the
communication timing parameters are presented in Table I.
For more details on the model, we refer the reader to [17].
B. Jamming Evaluation Platform
An experimental radio jammer platform is created to en-
able us to study the effects of communication disruption on
various control schemes. The platform consists of a separate
WiFi Sniffer and Jammer, controlled through a laptop (ASUS
X555U running Ubuntu 16.04). The platform aims to jam all
three of the in-valve sensor/actuator nodes on the WaterBox.
The Sniffer laptop is positioned at a distance of 185cm,
138cm, and 110cm from the three respective in-valve sen-
sor/actuator nodes on the WaterBox (DMA0, DMA1, DMA2).
We use the Tshark packet sniffing tool to put the RTl8821ae
WiFi card into promiscuous mode in order to capture all of
the WiFi traffic in the range of the laptop.
Jammer is located at a distance of 170cm, 120cm, and 95cm
from the in-valve sensor/actuator nodes. The jamming signal is
pure white noise (uniform random) generated and transmitted
by a USRP B210 SDR at its maximum transmit power of
10dBm. The Jammer is connected by USB 3.0 to the Sniffer,
and powered by an external power supply. We control the
Jammer through GNU radio (version 3.7.9).
The Sniffer and Jammer are connected together in a Python
2.7 script. The script makes calls to Tshark that gathers data,
processes that data, and then uses GNU radio libraries to
actuate the jamming strategies.
In the Alg. 1 we present the implementation of the WiFi
protocol aware jamming strategy for periodic CPS nodes that
uses the following functions:
• calcPhase(·) - In order to synchronize the jammer and
target device, the Tshark listener and jammer are called
concurrently. The timings of both functions are compared
to determine if a phase offset exists and if so, is applied
to the jammer trigger in future time slots.
• triggerJammer(·) - This function triggers the SDR (jam-
mer) for period td and with phase offset Ph.
• updatePeriod(·) and triggerJammer(·) are run concur-
rently to determine if there is a phase offset between
Algorithm 1: WiFi Protocol Aware Jamming Strategy
Input : Listening Duration tl, Jamming Duration td
t0 = time.now(·) // Records epoch time
α← triggerTShark(tl) // Calls Sniffer in monitor mode
ω ← filterMsg(node, router, datalength)
// Reduces stored set α to target node(s)
for key ∈ ω[1 :] do
β ← (key − t0)
t0 ← key
end
// Calculates array message inter arrival time β
P ← median(β)
// Median of β used to determine periodicity of node
Ph ← calcPhase(·)
// Calculates phase offset to synchronize
// Jammer with target device to be jammed
while True do
triggerJammer(P, td, Ph) // Calls jamming function
P, Ph ← updatePeriod(·) // Checks for changes to P , Ph
end
the target node and the jammer. If so this is passed to
recalculate the new trigger time. This ensures adaptivity
when the underlying physical phenomenon changes.
C. Experimental Results
This section summarizes the results of our design approach
evaluation. These allows us to understand the resilience of our
controllers, and the affects of our attackers on a WDN CPS.
The resilience of control schemes and the effectiveness of
the attack are evaluated based on the following metrics:
• Deviation of the water level from the steady-state value
(in %, maximum value of three DMA tanks) - It indicates
the maximum system’s deviation from the safe operating
conditions which is critical for water networks.
• Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) (in %, the average of three
DMA tanks) - It is the ratio of the number of messages
received by the controller and the number of messages
sent by the target node.
• Difficulty of detection (in %) - It represents the percent-
age of time jammer spends on transmitting the signal.
First we give the result that represents the normal system
operation for which the communication is unaffected by jam-
mers. This case is considered as the baseline for the evaluation
of four WaterBox control schemes (TTC, PETC, PSDETC
and PADETC) under constant, random and protocol aware
jamming attacks. The number of experiments was selected
experimentally by analysing the variance of the results (i.e.
under 2% of the mean value). Experiment time is 600s, unless
the system experiences failure earlier due to jamming activity.
1) Baseline Performance: During the normal operating
conditions, the WaterBox provides identical responses under
different control schemes (the control goal and the operating
conditions are the same). Therefore, we present the system’s
response only for the TTC scheme (see Fig. 5).
It takes 33 seconds (on average) for the system to reach
the steady-state value and continues operating within the safe
Fig. 5. System’s response under normal operating conditions for TTC.
Fig. 6. System’s response under constant jamming for TTC: 1) Top - Jamming
started while system was in the 2nd weak mode 2) Bottom - Jamming started
while system was in the 3rd powerful mode.
bounds (in our case between 1cm and 3cm). Due to the
nature of the system (all three tanks are controlled by a single
pump) and the limited size of the DMA tanks, the system
may experience overshoots and undershoots. This is expressed
through the deviation metric in Table II. As the behaviour of
our system is known and bounded, the acceptable deviation is
up to 15%. Everything over is considered as the failure.
The system achieves very high PDR values for all control
schemes. This is due to the fact that the communication
is unaffected and there is no jamming activity present. The
results for different control schemes are presented in Table II.
2) Constant Jamming: The constant jamming transmissions
are completely effective in terms of achieved PDR and the
system’s deviation from the normal operation conditions. The
communication is completely blocked and the system expe-
riences a complete failure for all control schemes, i.e. the
system overflows or underflows (see Table II). We present
the system’s response only for TTC scheme as other control
schemes perform similarly (see Fig. 6).
The negative side of this jamming strategy is the ease of
detection. As the constant jammer transmits 100% of the time
it can be easily located and stopped.
3) Random Jamming: The jammer chooses its transmis-
sions randomly which results in lack of the guarantees for
system failing. As it can be seen in Fig. 7, the random
TABLE II
THE EVALUATION OF THE RESILIENCE OF VARIOUS CONTROL SCHEMES TOWARDS CONSTANT, RANDOM AND PROTOCOL AWARE JAMMING.
Control scheme Baseline Jamming Constant Jamming Random Jamming Protocol aware
0% jamming time 100% jamming time 50% jamming time 25% jamming time
Deviation (%) PDR (%) Deviation (%) PDR (%) Deviation (%) PDR (%) Deviation (%) PDR (%)
TTC 12.42 99.13 FAIL∗ 6.26 61.84 78.15 FAIL∗ 21.90
PETC 10.11 99.50 FAIL∗ 5.88 15.33 81.46 FAIL∗ 24.83
PSDETC 11.39 98.81 FAIL∗ 6.35 FAIL∗ 64.67 FAIL∗ 50.82
PADETC 12.98 98.07 FAIL∗ 6.87 FAIL∗ 59.99 36.33 88.31
*the system overflows or underflows as the system deviation is larger than ±15%
TABLE III
PROBABILITY OF RANDOM JAMMING WRT THE JAMMING DURATION
Duration(s) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Probab.(%) 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Fig. 7. System’s response under random jamming for different control
schemes. Jamming started while system was in the 4th weak mode for TTC,
3rd powerful mode for PETC, 2nd weak mode for PSDETC and PADETC.
jammer leads to a complete failure for PSDETC and PADETC
control schemes, while TTC and PETC continue to operate,
but outside the acceptable deviation range (see Table II).
While this jamming strategy is more difficult to detect
compared to constant jamming, there is a big variance in the
results and no guarantees can be provided. Table III shows the
probability of jamming the system with respect to the jamming
duration. As it can be seen, with a random jamming period of
500ms, there is high probability of 60% to jam the system.
Note that the results presented in Table II for the random
jammer are not averaged for all experiments due to the lack
of consistency (i.e. the high variance of the results).
4) Protocol Aware Jamming: The protocol aware jammer
transmits only 25% of the time. Compared to the constant
and the random jammer, it is the least detectable. By learning
the transmission period and phase, it is able to completely
jam TTC and PETC schemes. In both cases the PDR drops
under 25% and the system fails (see Table II). The results are
depicted in Fig. 8. For all of the experiments the jammer was
Fig. 8. System’s response under protocol aware jamming for different control
schemes.
started once the system reached the steady-state.
The reduction in the transmissions for the PSDETC scheme
increases its resilience towards the protocol aware jammer.
This can be observed via the PDR that is doubled compared
to TTC and PETC. However, as the time evolves the lack
of information affects the system’s stability. The only scheme
that shows the resilience to our protocol aware jammer is the
PADETC. It achieves high PDR and the system is able to
maintain the normal operation while under jamming attack.
As it can be seen from Fig. 8, the deviation from the normal
operating conditions is outside the safe bounds by 21.33%.
This is contributed to the lost data which delays the controller’s
operation (and therefore the actuation). The system reacts
slower than expected. We overcome this problem by extending
the current model by the dynamical estimator.
5) PADETC with the Estimator under Protocol aware Jam-
ming: The resilience of the PADETC is further improved
through the addition of the dynamical estimator. The data that
is lost due to jamming activity is estimated as presented in
Sec. III-C. The data estimation is performed every 2 seconds
if no data has been received during that period.
The deviation from the normal operating conditions is
reduced from 36.33% to 10% (on average). The control
decisions are made as soon as the threshold is violated. The
results are depicted in Fig. 9. For more clear results we present
Fig. 9. System’s response under protocol aware jamming for PADETC with
a dynamic estimator.
the system’s response for the first 250s; however, the system’s
behaviour repeats as the time evolves. Note that the PADETC-
based scheme for CPSs that features an estimator can be used
to increase the resilience of the system to communication
disruption in general, not just from jamming attacks.
D. Design Approach Results
To summarise the results of our design approach, we can
see that the PADETC control strategy with an estimator is
resilient to protocol aware jamming. It is also the most energy
efficient as the sensors transmit states asynchronously to the
controller when the triggering condition is satisfied.
Our design approach also gives us an understanding of the
resiliency limits of PADETC to different jamming strategies.
No controller can cope with the constant jamming strategy.
This is a limit that no control strategy alone can overcome.
This is made less severe by realising that a constant jammer is
easy to detect, and can be found and stopped with little effort.
The resilience of PADETC to the random jammer is highly
variable. When the jamming window is more than 50%, the
scheme will fail. This is another limit, but a probabilistic one.
As the jamming window of the random jammer increases, its
detectability also increases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present a design approach to create a
CPS that is secure to communication jamming. Our approach
achieves this goal through the identification of the most
resilient control scheme to communication jamming attacks.
We demonstrate our approach by evaluating the TTC and
ETC control schemes. We created plausible threats in the
form of jammers using different strategies. We evaluated the
resilience of the controllers to message loss caused by various
jamming strategies. This method allowed us to witness and
measure the success of each attack on a real CPS test-bed.
The results of our approach clearly showed that the PADETC
control scheme is resilient to protocol aware jamming. Results
also indicated the resilience limitations of this scheme.
Our work is important because it adds security to the
communication and control co-design problem. We increase
the fidelity of our results by evaluating on a real test-bed
so that we can measure the impact of the attacks. This is
especially topical because service providers like water and
electricity utility companies are currently studying the use
of CPSs. We have clearly demonstrated a method to assess
the security weaknesses of certain types of control schemes,
and shown that certain control schemes are more robust to
communication attacks than others.
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